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Abstract
Remotely Piloted Aircraft Systems (RPAS) are new airspace users that require to
be safely integrated into the non-segregated airspace. Currently, their integration
is planned for the horizon 2025, but there is a lot of pressure by RPAS operators to
fly as soon as possible. This research focuses on the development of a risk-based
framework for the integration of RPAS in non-segregated airspace. The risk-based
framework relies on a hierarchical methodology that is split into two time horizons:
design and operation. Different operational and geometrical factors characterise
each stage. Then, a set of risk and operational indicators are defined for each stage.
These indicators evaluate the operational airspace state and provide information
about how the integration of RPAS should be. Primary results provide information
about geographical and temporary restrictions. Geographical restrictions refer to
the airways that favour or inhibit the integration of RPAS, and temporary
restrictions denote the time span when the RPAS can pierce into the airspace.
Keywords: air traffic management, risk assessment, risk-based framework, RPAS,
RPAS integration
1. Introduction
The integration of Remotely Piloted Aircraft System (RPAS) in non-segregated
airspace is one of the most complex and demanding challenges for the aviation
community in the years ahead. The beginning of RPAS integration in non-
segregated airspace is expected to be reached by the time frame 2025, according to
European RPAS Steering Group [1]. This aim requires broad and structured analysis
of the current situation as well as the potential solutions to be implemented. In this
way, the development of a risk-based framework to ensure the safe integration of
RPAS is crucial for its achievement.
RPAS operation in upper airspace does not require higher technological devel-
opments, but it demands detailed analysis about the safety of their integration with
conventional aircraft. European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) and Federal Avia-
tion Administration (FAA) require that the integration of RPAS must not imply a
diminish on current safety levels [2, 3]. This requirement means that further
research is required to accomplish this goal. A new framework will be compulsory
in the future to take the operational features of RPAS into account. One of the goals
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of this framework is to allow setting out the safety of the RPAS operation jointly
with conventional aircraft [4–6].
Could RPAS fly safely in non-segregated aircraft? The complexity of the answer
does not fall into a yes or not issue, because it must be yes, but instead we must
focus on how. Currently, conventional aircraft fly according to prefixed routes that
are modelled according to air traffic flow patterns, although there are several
airspaces based on free-route [7]. Then, RPAS must adapt to the current airway
network and current air traffic patterns. One of the main concerns is that RPAS
operational patterns can differ from conventional aircraft ones [8, 9]. Although
RPAS could be assumed to be modelled as slow conventional aircraft, there are
uncertainties about communications, navigation and surveillance issues that must
be analysed in advance [10].
Due to this lack of operational and technical knowledge about RPAS operation,
regulators and Airspace Navigation Service Providers (ANSPs) seek to introduce
RPAS based on a minimum interaction with conventional aircraft [11, 12]. The
problem arises when both airspace users operate jointly in the same scenario where
the interaction between them cannot be avoided. The first solution to his problem is
the segregation of specific air traffic volumes for the different airspace users. How-
ever, this segregation should only focus on specific flight levels (FLs) or airways, as
airspace cannot be completely segregated in different air traffic volumes for PRAS
and conventional aircraft. One of the expected outcomes of this work is to appraise
airways or FLs segregation for RPAS.
The most complex assessments about RPAS integration focus on three research
areas. The first deals with the global problem of risk management. Clothier et al.
[13] developed a framework for structuring the safety case of the RPAS operation.
Moreover, various regulators assessed the primary difficulties that must be solved
before RPAS operation [14, 15]. The second research area analyses the risk imposed
by the single flight for one RPAS in terms of the number of casualties. Several
authors developed different risk models to calculate what kind of populated areas
are riskier for on-ground pedestrians [16–18]. The third research area involves the
development of collision/conflict-risk models for the integration of RPAS. There are
several studies about RPAS collision avoidance [9, 19, 20] (similar to conventional
aircraft situations) but few of them focus on conflict risk [21, 22]. Conflict risk is a
prior indicator of collision risk. However, none of those studies responds either how
the RPAS integration should be or where RPAS could fly in non-segregated airspace.
With the goal of responding to the above research questions, it is required to
assess the safety level of the airspace and to develop one specific methodology.
Manual 9689 of International Civil Aviation Organisation (ICAO) [23] sets out that
airspace planning requires a thorough analysis of every factor that could affect
safety. In [24, 25], authors claimed the need for airspace design fulfilling levels of
safety under different operational features. Different models were developed to
evaluate the collision risk based on airspace geometry [26, 27]. A step further,
Netjasov [28] developed a conflict-risk model to assess the level of safety, including
air traffic flows. However, there is not a unique methodology that allows analysing
the airspace risk-state for the integration of RPAS.
Therefore, the main goal of this research is to develop a risk-based framework to
provide geographical and temporary restrictions for the safe integration of RPAS.
The risk-based framework is split into two different temporal horizons: design and
operation. The risk-based framework evaluates the state of the scenario regarding
different risk-based indicators. The risk-based indicators relies on geometrical and
operational features of airspace. The risk-based indicators sort airways and crossing
points to detect airways (or flight levels): (1) where RPAS can operate because their
integration is safe, and (2) when should be planned the operation of RPAS
2
Risk Assessment in Air Traffic Management
depending on a particular schedule of conventional aircraft. A further aim is to set
out the pillars of a future decision-making process for ANSPs.
The rest of the article is structured as follows. Section 2 presents the structure of
the risk-based framework and defines the different types of variables and indicators
that must be considered. The risk-based indicators constitute the main outputs of
the methodology that permit to assess the viability of the RPAS integration. It also
describes the methodology for the design phase and the operational phase. Section 3
presents the case study and the application to one Spanish airspace volume and
discusses the results. Lastly, Section 4 summarises the main contributions and
further works.
2. Risk-based framework
The risk-based framework aims to analyse the safe integration of RPAS in non-
segregated airspace. In non-segregated airspace, both conventional aircraft and
RPAS must operate together. The problem arises when RPAS operate with different
technical and operational features than conventional aircraft. Then, the integration
of RPAS focuses on reducing their impact on conventional aircraft; in other words,
RPAS must adapt themselves to current operations reducing their impact on current
aviation. The risk-based framework is split into two phases depending on the
operational information available:
• design phase: this phase aims to appraise the impact of RPAS in non-segregated
airspace for strategical phase. It can be applied both for design purposes and
for analysing the operation of one particular scenario. This phase works with
basic information of an airspace volume: airway structure and air traffic flow;
and
• operational phase: this phase addresses a temporal horizon where 1-hour
schedule of conventional aircraft is evaluated. The goal is to analyse how the
introduction of RPAS affects one specific schedule.
2.1 Design phase
This phase evaluates the way the integration of RPAS affects the airspace in a
design or strategic phase. Thus, this analysis covers different input variables as the
morphology or geometry and the main characteristics of the air traffic flow that
operates at the airspace. The main results of this phase are:
• thorough knowledge of the current airspace state, where it is intended to
integrate RPAS jointly with conventional aircraft; and
• identification of the airways and FLs that allows their segregated use for RPAS.
The segregated use implies that the RPAS can fly without any affection to the
conventional aircraft.
Design-phase indicators provide information about the state of the airways and
the crossing points. They are the most elementary components to analyse the
current operational situation of the airspace. These indicators separately evaluate
the morphological and geometrical features of the airspace (static indicators) and
their operation (dynamic indicators).
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2.1.1 Static indicators
Static indicators provide information to analyse the current state of the airspace
based on its morphology and geometry. The goal is to perform a prior analysis
setting out the airspace design. Static indicators focus on the basic airspace
components: airways and crossing points.
2.1.1.1 Static indicator of airway complexity
The complexity of an airway is characterised by the sections that are exposed to
risk. The risk in an airway is modelled by the locations of the airway that are
exposed to conflict with aircraft of other airways. These sections are denoted as
critical sections (di,j) around the crossing point. The static indicator of airway
complexity relates to the ratio of the airway that is exposed to conflict in regards
to the whole length of the airway (Li).
βi ¼
P
j 6¼idi,j
Li
dij ¼
2Smin
sin αij
(1)
where i and j are the airways that intersect at the crossing point, αi,j is the angle
between both airways, and Smin is the separation minima (typically 5 Nautical
Miles—NM).
2.1.1.2 Static indicator of crossing-point complexity
The complexity of a crossing point depends on the number of intersections
between the airway pairs that coincides at it and the angle between the airway pairs.
In this way, combining both factors, it can be calculated the static indicator of
crossing-point complexity:
γn ¼
P
WPn
di,j
delem
(2)
where
P
WPn
di,j is the sum of all critical sections in a crossing point (WPn) and
delem represents the elementary critical section. The elementary critical section is
calculated for the crossing angle of 900, which provides the minimum critical
section.
2.1.2 Dynamic indicators
Dynamic indicators focus on the operational features of the airspace. This allows
analysing the operational characteristics of the air traffic flows to select the airway
that favour or inhibit the RPAS integration.
2.1.2.1 Dynamic indicator of airway density
This indicator provides information about the number of aircraft that operates
an airway. It relates the real airway density Q ið Þ and the theoretical maximum air
traffic flow through it Qmaxi
 
.
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δi ¼
Q i
Qm ́axi
Qm ́axi ¼
við Þ
Smin
(3)
where við Þ is the average speed of aircraft in airway i.
2.1.2.2 Dynamic indicator of crossing-point density
Taking into account the operational characteristics of the airspace, the dynamic
indicator of crossing-point density provide an indicator of the number of aircraft
that pass through it.
ϵn ¼
X
i, j€WPn
i 6¼ j
δi (4)
2.1.2.3 Dynamic indicator of airway conflict
This indicator evolves from the previous dynamic indicators with a different
goal. δ and ϵ are relative counters of the air traffic through the airways and crossing
points, while ζ is the dynamic indicator of airway conflict. This indicator provides
information about the possibility of conflict depending on the airspace operational
features.
ζi ¼
X
∀n€i
X
i, j€WPn
i 6¼ j
δiδj (5)
Moreover, this indicator also works as a reference value to analyse the air traffic
segregation by airways and FLs. Therefore, it is needed to calculate the total value
for the whole airspace based on the sum of every airway conflict indicator:
ζtot ¼
X
ζi (6)
2.2 Operational phase
The operational phase focuses on a different temporal horizon than the design
phase. The operational phase is characterised by the disappearance of generic air
traffic flows (modelled by airway density and average ground speed), and it entails
a one-hour schedule. This schedule of air traffic fulfils the operational characteris-
tics of the scenario, but each aircraft has its own characteristics (speed and entry
time). Besides, this concept will relay on further work based on 4D trajectories. The
operational phase allows the introduction of RPAS in specific schedules. Apart from
analysing how this introduction affects the risk indicators, this phase provides the
following results:
• in-depth knowledge of the path evolution from the conventional aircraft
schedule;
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• safety assessment for the RPAS integration for different schedules based on the
risk indicators; and
• identification of airways and FLs that favour or inhibit the introduction of
RPAS based on the airway availability.
Operational-phase indicators provide information about the whole airspace. In
this way, they permit to appraise the airspace situation by the RPAS integration.
These indicators conclude if the integration of RPAS is feasible and the temporary
restrictions.
2.2.1 Number of conflict
Nc is the number of times that the separation minima are infringed (5 NM in
European en-route airspace).
Nc ¼ Number of times min sep tð Þð Þ< Smin (7)
where min s tð Þð Þ is the minimum distance between an aircraft pair.
2.2.2 Conflict severity
Conflict severity (θ) is an indicator of the seriousness of the conflict, as not
every conflict implies the same severity. Conflict severity is calculated by the
combination of the conflict time span (τ) and the minimum distance reached by an
aircraft pair:
θ ¼ min sep tð Þð Þτ (8)
2.2.3 Airway availability
This indicator aims to calculate the risk exposition of an aircraft flying an
airway. This indicator is called airway availability because it links the time span the
aircraft can safely fly an airway with the time span the aircraft can suffer a conflict.
Knowing the airways that present higher availability (the time span the aircraft can
safely fly without suffering a conflict), it can be extracted the airways that favour or
inhibit the integration of RPAS.
λi indicator is based on the Temporary-Blocking Windows (TBWs) concept
[29, 30]. The TBWs are calculated for every aircraft pair, i.e. the time span that the
airways are blocked because a separation minima infringement will occur. The
primary features of the TBWs are:
• the time duration of the TBWs depends on the crossing angle of the airways
and the ground speed of the aircraft involved; and
• the time location of the TBWs depends on the entry time of the conventional
aircraft and RPAS, length of the airways, the ground speed and the distance
between the airway entry-point and the crossing point.
λi is calculated by the size of overall TBW dBWð Þ that affect the airway i.
Therefore, the risk exposition of an aircraft relates the non-available time tNAið Þ and
the exposition time texp
 
:
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λi ¼ 1
tNAi
texp
where 0≤ λi ≤ 1 (9)
Herein, the exposition time relates to a one-hour schedule. A minor TBW
implies a bigger airway availability, which reduces the risk exposition. Moreover,
airway availability is a novel indicator defined in this work. There is no previous
knowledge about the threshold that this indicator should acquire. Then, the authors
propose a division into four stretches (0–25%, 25–50%, 50–75% and 75–100%).
Airways with airway availability greater than 50% are airways where RPAS could
be included.
3. Risk-based framework application
The risk-based framework was applied to the air traffic volume LECMPAU
(Pamplona) in Spain. This airspace is constituted by 24 airways and 55 crossing
points. The period of study was July and August 2016, and the operational data was
obtained from NEST [31].
3.1 Design phase
This section introduces the results of the design phase in the strategical horizon.
This is the most valuable innovation of this work, and a further motivation is related
to the fact that this methodology could also be applied to a pre-tactical phase. The
design phase focused on a fix air traffic distribution for the whole day while in the
pre-tactical phase, a temporary variation of the air traffic flow for a specific day
could be considered. However, the application for a pre-tactical phase was out of
the scope of this work. The process was as follows:
1.airways and crossing point were characterised based on the geometric
information (length, angle and critical section) and operational information
(air traffic flow and average speed); and
2.static and dynamic indicators were calculated for each airway and crossing
point. With this information, we ordered and analysed which of them had a
greater impact on safety.
3.1.1 Design-phase indicators
Firstly, design-phase indicators are calculated for LECMPAU both for airways
and for crossing points. However, for the sake of clarity, we only present the results
for the airway due to the high number of crossing points. Table 1 shows the results
for the design-phase indicators of the LECMPAU airways.
βi indicator was constituted by the number of crossing points, the number of
intersecting airways, their crossing angles and their lengths. The primary conclu-
sions were:
• most of the values of βi were, in general, very high because LECMPAU
presented 55 crossing points and 24 airways;
• the lowest values referred to the airway UM190 (βUM190 ¼ 0, 7518) because
there were only two intersections. This airway presented 75% of complexity
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that was very high, although this was the lowest value. This meant that
throughout the 75% of the airway length, an aircraft could suffer conflict with
other air traffic flows; and
• the highest values were referred to as airways UQ262 (βUQ262 ¼ 5, 4207 with
6 intersections), UL866 (βUL866 ¼ 7:1743 with 9 intersections) and UN995
(βUN995 ¼ 7, 0303 with 9 intersections). It was obvious that the number of
intersections implied higher values of complexity, but it was also remarkable
that the length of the airways was a crucial factor for complexity. Therefore,
the crossing point PPN was the most concurred and provided the highest value
of complexity.
Therefore, the highest values of the airway complexity static indicator
were referred to the airways that concurred at crossing point PPN. Figure 1
shows a representation of the static indicators of the airway and crossing-point
complexity.
Regarding the dynamic indicator of airway density (δi), see Table 1, there were
13 airways without air traffic (54%) and 25 crossing points without air traffic (45%)
Airway βi δi
UN858 1.00 0.0037
UM190 0.75 0
UP181 3.18 0.0090
UL176 4.40 0.0267
UQ262 5.42 0
UQ148 2.07 0
UN10 3.25 0.0267
UN857 3.92 0.0046
UL866 7.17 0.0005
UN995 7.03 0.0043
UN976 3.14 0.0275
UM601 2.84 0.0478
UM176 4.00 0
UQ57 3.04 0
UQ73 3.94 0
UT430 2.09 0
UP152 4.03 0.0034
UN725 1.21 0.0385
UQ400 1.18 0
UQ88 1.46 0
UL184 1.93 0
UQ424 1.45 0
UQ300 1.52 0
UQ268 2.10 0
Table 1.
Design-phase indicators for LECMPAU airways.
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in this airspace. This implied that the air traffic flow distribution was rather con-
centrated in specific airways and crossing points.
3.1.2 Airway segregation
The airway segregation aimed to identify the airways (or geographical restric-
tions) that allowed the safe integration of RPAS because they did not generate
conflicts with conventional aircraft. First, the total value for the whole airspace of
the dynamic indicator of airway conflict (ζtot ¼ 0:0037) was calculated. Second,
the airways without air traffic were individually evaluated by the introduction of
RPAS through them (δi ¼ 0! δi ¼ 1). Then, ζtot was recalculated to check if the
new ζtot exceeded the base-scenario value. In this case, the airway could not be
segregated because the introduction of RPAS increased current risk levels; other-
wise, RPAS could be introduced because they did not cross with other air traffic
flows. Table 2 presents the results of the indicator ζi.
As can be seen in Table 2, no airway was identified for its segregation.
3.1.3 FL segregation
The primary conclusion of the previous section was that no airway could be
segregated at LECMPAU. In spite of this limitation, this work evaluated the exis-
tence of specific FLs that allowed the safe integration of RPAS. The process was
similar to airway segregation but focusing on the FLs of interest: from FL250
to FL300.
Figure 1.
Results of the design-phase analysis.
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There are five airways that could be segregated at different FLs for the integra-
tion of RPAS, see Figure 1. UQ400, UQ88 and UQ300 presented three FLs (260,
280 and 300) where RPAS could be integrated without any interaction with con-
ventional aircraft. UM176 and UQ74 could be segregated at FL270 (see Table 3).
ζFLtot varied for each FL their value, which implied that it would be required to
estimate a specific and independent value for ζtot. This independent value would
remove inefficiencies for the integration of RPAS.
3.2 Operational phase
3.2.1 Base schedule with RPAS
To study the operational phase, a real one-hour schedule was selected from the
rush hour of LECMPAU at FL290. Table 4 shows the operational information of the
schedule composed of four conventional aircraft and one RPAS. In this schedule,
one RPAS is introduced by UM176 with a typical speed of 250 kts.
3.2.2 Temporary-blocking windows (TBWs)
The first step was to calculate the TBWs that will underline the airway indicator
and conflict detection. Table 5 provides de length or time span of the TBWs for the
different aircraft that could interact between them.
The length of the TBWs increased with the RPAS due to its lower speed. The
TBWs (i.e. the time exposed to conflict) almost doubled the value for conventional
aircraft. Table 6 provides the temporary limits (initial and final) for the TBWs
between aircraft pairs.
3.2.3 Operational-phase indicators
According to the TBWs, aircraft with an entry time located inside the TBWs
entailed a conflict between those aircraft pairs. In this example, there was no
Airway ζ tot
UM190 0.0108
UQ262 0.1449
UQ148 0.1567
UM176 0.0422
UQ57 0.0689
UQ73 0.0422
UT430 0.1210
UQ400 0.0304
UQ88 0.0304
UL184 0.0350
UQ424 0.0350
UQ300 0.0304
UQ268 0.1837
Base-scenario ζtot 0.0037
Table 2.
Results of ζtot for LECMPAU airway segregation.
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conflict between any aircraft. In the same way, there was no conflict; the indicator
of conflict severity was zero.
However, airway availability was calculated for all airways taking into account
base schedule, see Table 7.
The airway availability indicator decreased with the introduction of RPAS. In the
case λi ¼ 0 (UQ262 and UN857), it meant that there was no availability of this
airway because the introduction of an RPAS through the airways could imply one
Airway ζ250
tot
ζ260
tot
ζ270
tot
ζ280
tot
ζ290
tot
ζ300
tot
UN858 0 0 0 0 0 0
UM190 0.4903 0.5911 1.0445 1.7939 2.3628 1.1805
UP181 0.5528 0 0 0 0 0
UL176 0.2512 0 0 0 0 0
UQ262 0.4382 1.0439 1.5495 3.0551 2.7039 2.5510
UQ148 0.5058 0.9344 1.4552 2.7312 2.8154 2.9160
UN10 0 0.7542 0 1.1512 0 1.6451
UN857 0 0 0 1.0887 0 0.9156
UL866 0.9234 0.4331 1.1965 1.0887 0 0.9156
UN995 0 0 0 0 0 0
UN976 0 0 0 0 0 0
UM601 0 0 0 0 0 0
UM176 0.2564 0.2888 0.4519 0.9624 2.2068 1.4878
UQ57 0.3028 0.2888 0.5137 0.9624 2.4138 1.4878
UQ73 0.2564 0.2888 0.4519 0.9624 2.2068 1.4878
UT430 0.5058 0.4726 1.0935 1.9611 2.4653 2.5284
UP152 0.4903 1.0529 0 0 2.7128 1.5682
UN725 0 0 0.5137 0 0 0
UQ400 0.2351 0.1690 0.5137 0.8999 2.2080 0.7584
UQ88 0.2351 0.1690 0.5137 0.8999 2.2080 0.7584
UL184 0.6088 0.3702 0.9449 0.8999 2.6966 0.7584
UQ424 0.6088 0.3702 0.9449 0.8999 2.6966 0.7584
UQ300 0.2351 0.1690 0.5137 0.8999 2.2080 0.7584
UQ268 0.8537 1.3565 1.0451 2.5607 3.3841 3.3381
Table 3.
Values of ζFL
tot
for each airway and FL.
Aircraft Airway Entry time FL V(kts)
1 UL176 12:13:56 290 310.13
2 UM601 12:20:31 290 416.67
3 UN10 12:25:00 290 420.11
4 UL176 12:57:28 290 351.75
RPAS UM176 12:30:00 290 250
Table 4.
Schedule of LECMPAU with one RPAS.
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Aircraft 1 2 3 4 RPAS
1 — 206 — — —
2 206 — 177 192 310
3 — 177 — — 641
4 — 192 — — —
RPAS — 310 641 — —
Table 5.
Temporary-blocking windows (sec) for the base schedule.
Aircraft 1 2 3 4 RPAS
1 — [12:15:18,
12:18:44]
— — —
2 [12:15:43,
12:19:08]
— [12:20:19,
12:23:16]
[12:16:25,
12:19:37]
[12:14:12,
12:19:22]
3 — [12:22:15,
12:25:12]
— — [12:14:40,
12:25:21]
4 — [12:58:22,
13:01:34]
— — —
RPAS — [12:51:09,
12:56:19]
[12:49:39,
13:00:20]
— —
Entry
time
12:13:56 12:20:31 12:25:00 12:57:28 12:30:00
Table 6.
Initial and final time of the TBWs.
Airway λAWYj
UN858 0.8932
UM190 1
UP181 0.1488
UL176 0.8917
UQ262 0
UQ148 0.2907
UN10 0.8901
UN857 0
UL866 0.6741
UN995 0.7024
UN976 0.7093
UM601 0.7007
UM176 0.5572
UQ57 0.3298
UQ73 0.6176
UT430 0.8931
UP152 0.4501
12
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conflict during the 1 hour. On the contrary, in the case λi ¼ 1 (UM190, UL184,
UQ424 and UQ300) there was full availability for the safe introduction of RPAS. In
other words, those airways allowed the introduction of RPAS because no interaction
with conventional aircraft would occur. Results of this indicator should provide
similar results to the dynamic indicator of airway conflict. However, air traffic
flows of the operational phase are not the same as the design phase because of the
specific rush hour characteristics.
4. Conclusions
This research developed a new risk-based framework to evaluate the safe intro-
duction of RPAS in non-segregated airspace. The risk-based framework tackled two
temporal horizons for the introduction of RPAS based on a design phase (strategical
horizon) and an operational phase (tactical horizon). This innovative approach
allowed considering the different variables that affected the aircraft operation at
both temporal horizons, which ensured a hierarchical assessment. The design phase
covered different input variables as the morphology or geometry, and the main
characteristics of the air traffic flow. Meanwhile, the operational phase was
characterised by the disappearance of generic air traffic flows (modelled by airway
density and average ground speed) and focused on a one-hour schedule (consti-
tuted by conventional aircraft and RPAS). Different indicators were modelled
depending on the temporal horizon. The design phase considered static and
dynamic indicators (based on the airspace structure and generic air traffic flows).
The operational phase considered three indicators: number of conflicts, conflict
severity and airway availability. The application of the methodology was to detect
geographical restrictions (airways that favour or inhibit the integration of RPAS)
and temporary restrictions (when the RPAS can pierce into the airspace without
generating any conflict).
This methodology was applied to Spanish airspace LECMPAU at different FLs
from FL250 to FL300, which were the most favourable for RPAS integration due to
their low density. The different static indicators ordered airways considering their
complexity. LECMPAU was a complex scenario because of the high number of
airways and crossing points. The airway segregation analysis concluded that no full
airway could be segregated for RPAS; however, different FLs could be used consid-
ering their segregation for RPAS. The segregation of FLs for RPAS implied that they
could operate these FLs without being exposed to conflict with conventional air-
craft. A one-hour schedule of conventional aircraft was analysed for the
Airway λAWYj
UN725 0.8911
UQ400 0.8890
UQ88 0.8736
UL184 1
UQ424 1
UQ300 1
UQ268 0.6802
Table 7.
Airway availability indicator for FL290.
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introduction of one RPAS. Operational-phase indicators were assessed and based on
the temporary-blocking windows, no conflict arose. The temporary-blocking win-
dows provided the temporary restrictions for the integration of RPAS. Moreover,
the airway availability indicator ordered the airway providing information about
the airways that favoured (or inhibited) the introduction of RPAS with the
operational-phase specific schedule. Regarding future research lines, the calculation
of an independent and fixed value for conflict probability is crucial for the assess-
ment of different airspaces and FLs. A further goal will be the analysis of the whole
process to introduce flight plans of RPAS in non-segregated airspace ensuring safe
scenarios.
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